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Abstract:  The  National  Minimum  Drinking  Age  Act  of  1984  exemplifies  high -stakes 
legislation that attracted the interest of the public, legislators, academics, policy 
advocates,  and  executive  agencies.    This  paper  explores  how  these  actors 
combined  to  gen erate  intellectual  support  for  this  act  within  the  legislative 
process.  Limitations of the contemporaneous research required that the available 
evidence be evaluated judiciously.  This did not happen, because it is not fostered 
by  the  adversarial  nature  o f  the  process  and  because  its  most  influential 
participants, executive agencies heavily involved in traffic safety, lacked the 
necessary neutrality and expertise. 
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1  This research was sponsored by a grant from Choose Responsibility.   A companion paper, 
Grant  (2011),  documents  how  academic  findings  on  the  effects  of  three  major  laws –the 
minimum  legal  drinking  age,  zero  tolerance  laws,  and  .08  per  se  laws–become  much  less 
favorable over time and explains this evolution in terms of changes in study design and an ―early 
adopter  effect.‖  I  appreciate  comments  from  participants  at the  2011  Public  Choice  Society 
meetings, the research assistance of Kristin Boykin, and the cooperation of several interviewees. In  general  the  influence  of  the  public,  whether  directly  or  through  political 
institutions, has been pernicious to traffic safety.  It comes and goes, filling in the 
troughs  between  peaks  of  more  exciting  events;  it  seizes  on  issues  without 
concern for the relevance or tractability of the problems; it proposes ―solutions‖ 
which are at best naïve and at worst absurd, and above all it demands action even 
where action may be only a waste of money. 
 
–Frank Haight (1985) 
 
Although  it  is  hard  to  challenge  Haight‘s  characterization  of…the  political 
process in the area of traffic safety, his proposed solution of entrusting the issue to 
low-profile agencies…seems wishful and unrealistic.  His viewpoint neglects the 
fact that the recognition of any condition as a social problem is a political matter.  
It  is  not  helpful  for  underdogs  in  the  political  game  to  pick  up  their  chips, 
denounce  the  rules…and  look  elsewhere,  when  the  political  game  is  the  only 
game in town.  Even the experts are forced to play it, often as mere adjutants to 
parties with less sophistication but greater involvement and determination. 
 
–H. Laurence Ross (1992, p. 174) 
 
 
The  common  American  ideal  of  federalism  holds  that  the  states,  ―laboratories  of 
democracy,‖ experiment with various approaches to solving social problems; the most promising 
thrive and the others wither.  This ideal assumes, or requires, that these alternative approaches 
can be evaluated accurately.  Researchers readily recognize that this need not be so.  Even when 
using appropriate evaluation methodologies, the relative and absolute merits of any given policy 
are  often  uncertain,  because  of  differences  across  studies  in  research  design,  data,  and  the 
interpretation of the evidence. 
  The  academic  community  deals  with  this  uncertainty  patiently,  amassing  studies  and 
counter-studies over decades, and, given sufficient time and study, can often (though not always) 
arrive at a reasonable degree of consensus.  Policymakers, in contrast, rarely have this liberty.  
Solutions to many problems are needed more urgently, so that the evidence available at the point 
of decision may be deficient in both quality and quantity.  How does the political theatre, in 
which the evidence is presented, summarized, and evaluated, respond to these deficiencies?  Is it  
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structured to do so well? 
  General, generic answers to these questions, which typically emphasize the difference 
between  intellectual  idealism  and  political  reality,  are  abundant.    Specific,  comprehensive, 
context-rich  answers—which  are  required  to  truly  understand  the  past  or  to  make  realistic 
prescriptions for the future—are not.
2  These require precise descriptions of  what could have 
been known, or anticipated, about a policy‘s likely effects at the time it was adopted; historical 
context; and institutional specifics that clarify the relevant characteristics of the political process 
and of the key actors in that process, and show how they influence the outcome.  All of this can 
be obtained only by detailed study of specific policies or specific institutions. 
Accordingly, we conduct a comprehensive narrative of the process leading to the passage, 
in 1984, of the National Minimum Drinking Age Act (NMDAA), ―one of the most thoroughly 
evaluated social interventions of our time‖ (Ross, 1992).  This act, which provided strong and 
ultimately successful incentives for all states to raise the minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) to 
twenty-one, was empirically justified using inferences drawn from the experience of a small 
number  of  ―laboratory  states‖  that  had  recently  raised  their  MLDAs.    Transcripts  of 
                                                 
2 This paper appears to be the first extended narrative to comprehe nsively address the questions 
posed above.  The closest related works, both retrospective in spirit, appear to be Henig (2008), 
who compares how two forums, academia and the media, resolve differences about research 
findings in the area of charter schools,  and Tanenbaum (2009), who examines how Pay for 
Performance  came  to  be  implemented  in  Medicare  despite  little  concrete  evidence  on  its 
effectiveness.  While neither focuses on the role of evidence in the policy process, as this study 
does, similar themes pervade all three papers, suggesting at least some degree of universality. 
Two other, related literatures have a future orientation: metapolicy —―policy on how to 
make policy‖ (Dror, 1971, p. 74)—and robust political economy, which seeks to know ―which 
institutions perform best when people have limited knowledge and are prone to self-interested 
behavior‖  (Pennington,  2011,  p.3).    Both  stand  in  contrast  to  traditional  political  and 
―decisionist‖  models  of  policymaking,  which  emphasize  power  or  technocratic  merit, 
respectively, in favor of a conceptualization that ―link(s) the intellectual and political, economic 
and motivational aspects of the process‖ (Majone, 1989, p.148).  Neither contains the type of 
extended analysis conducted here.  
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congressional subcommittee hearings and other sources show how this evidence was employed 
within the political arena, while dozens of subsequent empirical studies are used both to more 
accurately assess the effects of the increased MLDA—to give the benefit of hindsight—and to 
identify the effect of different study features on their conclusions. 
  Because the available evidence on the effects of a raised MLDA was deficient in quantity 
and quality,  it  should  have  been evaluated with  judiciousness and discernment.   In practice, 
however, these qualities were largely missing, for three reasons that still apply today.  First, the 
adversarial aspect of the political system excluded and drowned out the relatively quiet voices of 
those who, by temperament or training, possessed such judiciousness.  This was true even though 
the NMDAA was bipartisan and the temper of the debate was civil.  Second, the forces for and 
against  the  raised  MLDA  were  not  evenly  matched  in  technical  or  political  skill,  further 
weakening the efficacy of the adversarial process.  Finally,  the key government agency that 
Congress  relies  upon  for  traffic  safety  advice,  the  National  Highway  Traffic  Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), exhibited neither the independence required for judiciousness nor the 
technical skills required for discernment.  These skills‘ absence was not accidental, but rather 
was  a  consequence  of  NHTSA‘s  organizational  design—in  particular,  the  ―make  or  buy‖ 
decision for traffic safety research—which itself supported the agency‘s objectives. 
Ultimately, for the NMDAA, the political process amplified, rather than dampened, the 
literature‘s overly-optimistic predictions of its likely effects.  This is not an isolated occurrence: 
similarly unrealized optimism was expressed over more recent traffic safety legislation promoted 
by Congress,  in part due to the active support of NHTSA, whose organizational design (for 




Section I.  A Brief History of the National Minimum Drinking Age Act. 
 
  Legislative activity to curtail youth drinking and drunk driving in general began in the 
late 1970s, a counterreaction to increased permissiveness earlier in the decade, when twenty-nine 
states lowered their drinking ages.  From 1976-1980, thirteen states raised their drinking ages, 
generally by one year.  Between 1981 and 1983, twelve more states raised their drinking ages, 
thirty-four states adopted per se blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limits, and eleven adopted 
administrative license revocation.  Activity crested between 1984 and 1986, with the passage of 
hundreds of state laws, as documented in Table 1, based on Howland (1988). 
This activity was associated with three concomitant social changes, two of which are also 
documented in the table.  The first was an increased social awareness of the dangers of drunk 
driving: media coverage of the issue, almost wholly absent during the 1970s, grew rapidly after 
1981.  Hundreds of stories appeared in major newspapers, and dozens of stories in magazines, 
during the next quadrennium.  Coverage in other media increased as well: 
I can see it from my experiences of ten, twelve years ago as Secretary, when if I 
could get one TV camera to come to a hearing or a meeting about drunk driving, I 
thought we were very fortunate.  They might stay as long as ten minutes.  Our first 
hearing in Oklahoma City [of the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving] we 
had  four  television  cameras,  twelve  radio  stations,  and  eight  or  nine  newspaper 
people there.  Two of the cameras stayed half a day and two stayed all day long.  
(John  Volpe,  former  Secretary  of  the  Department  of  Transportation  and  then-
Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, H1, 1983, p. 273.)
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This awareness translated into action:  hundreds of  organizations were  founded whose 
purpose was to curtail drunk driving.  The best known of these, Mothers Against Drunk Driving 
(MADD), played a key role in lobbying for the  NMDAA and subsequent legislation, including 
                                                 
3  This quote, like many others to follow, comes from the transcript of a Congressional hearing or 
Congressional debate.  These events are each listed in the chronology in the Appendix, labeled 
H0-H6, and cited within the text using that appellation.  
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.08 per se BAC limits, open container laws, and zero tolerance laws, and is still active today. 
  The final social change, in attitudes, can only be documented qualitatively:  
For…decades, the enormous toll of death and injury that occurred in the United 
States was regarded as accidental in almost a cosmic sense.  The statistical toll of 
road  accidents  was  collected  and  reported  with  an  air  of  fatalism  similar  to 
attitudes toward earthquakes, tornadoes, or other natural disasters.  At the same 
time, the…paradigm of responsibility began and ended with the personal fault of 
the parties to the accident.  The public perception now in the United States…is 
that the manner in which …laws are drafted and enforced can have important 
effects on highway deaths and injuries (Zimring, 1988). 
 
The American public is far less tolerant of drunk driving that they were ten years 
ago.  It‘s no longer funny for Johnny Carson to joke about the issue.   (Judith 
Stone, Director, Federal Affairs, National Safety Council, H5, June 1988, p. 24.) 
 
There really was a cultural shift in the 1980s I believe to where impaired driving 
was  no  longer  an  accepted  part  of  American  culture.  (Jeffrey  Runge, 
Administrator, NHTSA, H6, 2002, pp. 12, 16.)  
 
  While most legislative activity occurred at the state level, the issue also received attention 
within  the  federal  government,  partly  from  concern  about  ―blood  borders‖  created  by  youth 
driving across state lines to take advantage of a lower MLDA.  This took several forms, as 
documented in the extensive chronology of the activity surrounding the passage of the NMDAA 
that is located in the Appendix.  Transportation bills offered financial incentives to the states to 
adopt various drunk driving countermeasures, including but not limited to higher drinking ages.  
President Reagan appointed a highly-visible Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, which 
held nationwide hearings and ultimately issued dozens of recommendations on the issue.  Both 
NHTSA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) weighed in with written reports 
and testimony before Congressional subcommittees, which held several hearings on the problems 
of drunk driving and teenage drinking. 
  In 1983 and 1984 these forces built to a fever pitch and provided the impetus for strong 
federal action.  In November, 1983, the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, following in  
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the footsteps of MADD, the National Safety Council (NSC), the Insurance Institute for Highway 
Safety (IIHS), and the NTSB, formally recommended establishing a national drinking age of 
twenty-one in order to improve traffic safety.  A Gallup Poll taken earlier that year indicated that 
over three-fourths of the country was in support.  Multiple bills or amendments to mandate or 
encourage the raised drinking age were proffered in Congress.  The primary objector, President 
Reagan,  changed  his  position  in  June,  1984,  and  the  NMDAA  was  law  one  month  later.  
Challenges to the law‘s constitutionality were exhausted by 1987;  the next year the last two 
states raised their MLDAs to 21. 
 
Section II.  Evidence on the Effects of the Minimum Legal Drinking Age: Then and Now. 
 
The country‘s enthusiasm for a raised MLDA was matched by its supporters‘ optimism 
about its expected effect on traffic safety: 
Nearly every state that has raised the drinking age to twenty-one has produced a 
significant  drop  in  the  (sic)  teenage  driving  fatalities.    In  the  state  of  New 
Jersey...the rate dropped by twenty-six percent; Illinois, it has fallen twenty-three 
percent; in Michigan, thirty-one percent.  (President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on 
Signing HR 4616 into Law, July 17, 1984.) 
 
To some degree, however, this optimism contrasted with the incompleteness of the evidence on 
how the drinking age affects traffic safety—the law‘s raison d‘être.  The complete literature 
through 2009, forty years in length, is illustrated in Figure 1, taken from Grant (2011).  (This 
includes all studies published in an academic book or refereed journal that estimate the effect of 
the raised MLDA on the affected population.)  This ―bubble plot‖ illustrates many study features 
at once: the horizontal axis represents the publication date, which is generally a couple of years 
after  its  data  terminate,  and  the  vertical  axis  represents  the  estimated  percentage  effect  on  
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fatalities involving drivers affected by the changed MLDA, with insignificant estimates set to 
zero.  The volume of each bubble represents the number of academic citations in Google Scholar 
as of June 2009, with a minimum bubble size so that uncited studies are not eliminated.  (Later 
studies have less time in which to be cited, of course.)  Bubbles ringed in black circles are 
supported  by  external  funding,  generally  from  the  National  Institute  on  Alcohol  Abuse  and 
Alcoholism  (NIAAA).    Finally,  the  color  of  the  bubble  represents  the  study  design.    Blue 
represents quasi-experimental designs, which generally compare the change in fatalities in one, 
or a few, law-adopting states with that in control states that do not adopt the law.  (Sometimes 
these  changes  are  trend-adjusted  using  an  ARMA  model, and  some  control  groups  are  age-
related.)  Purple indicates pooled time-series cross-section (TSCS) regressions, which include 
control variables but not state and year fixed effects; white indicates panel regressions, which do 
include  these  fixed  effects;  and  red  represents  cross-section  regression.  Panel  designs  are 
preferred: they combine the before-after quality of quasi-experimental analyses with the breadth 
and explicit inclusion of control variables that are found in pooled TSCS regressions. 
  The MLDA literature contains studies of lowered drinking ages, based on data from the 
1970s, and subsequent studies of raised drinking ages.  The two are distinguished by the diagonal 
line in the figure.  One might expect the long term effect of raising the drinking age from 18 to 
21 to be equal and opposite that of moving in the reverse direction, unless the lower drinking age 
develops social conventions that prove difficult to dislodge, in which case it would be smaller.  
Nevertheless, evidence on the effects of lowered MLDAs was almost wholly absent from the 
testimony  we  have  reviewed,  though  the  best  of  this  evidence  (Cook  and  Tauchen,  1984, 
discussed below) spanned more states and years than any raised MLDA study could then muster.  
This remains a mystery: to our knowledge, no one tried to justify excluding these studies.  
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  For  the  literature  as  a  whole,  as  well  as  its  raised-MLDA  and  lowered-MLDA 
components, the differences in study findings are tremendous, with the estimated effect spanning 
more than thirty percentage points.  Some of these are relatively unsystematic, stemming from 
differences in the dependent variable (crashes or fatalities, all accidents or only night accidents, 
scaling  by  population  or  miles  travelled,  etc.),  the  states  and  control  groups  used  in  quasi-
experimental analyses, and the control variables included in regression analyses. 
Other differences are systematic.  These pertain to study design and execution date, and 
stem from an evolutionary process documented in Grant (2011) for this and other drunk driving 
literatures.  Early studies, dominated by quasi-experimental methods, yield highly variable yet 
generally favorable conclusions.  As the number of law-adopting states and post-law years grow, 
these are supplanted by pooled TSCS and, eventually, panel regressions, which are less variable 
and much less favorable.  This can be seen for studies of the lowered drinking age, in the left part 
of Figure 1, and is even more striking for studies of the raised drinking age, on the right.  There 
the  number  of  law-adopting  states  and  post  law-adoption  years  quickly  becomes  large, 
permitting extensive use of panel methods.  The two panel analyses of lowered MLDAs, Cook 
and Tauchen (1984) and Weinstein (1987), find traffic fatalities among the affected ages increase 
by six or seven percent.  Among panel analyses of raised MLDAs, early studies (whose data end 
before 1990, and which are discussed below) find estimates  of about 13%, but later studies‘ 
estimates average, again, six or seven percent.  (The estimates in these later studies—Dee, 1999; 
Eisenberg, 2003; Young and Likens, 2000; Young and Beilinska-Kwapisz 2006; Polnicki et al., 
2007; and Miron and Tetelbaum, 2009—range fairly uniformly from 3-11%.
4) 
                                                 
4 The only other MLDA study using modern methods, Dobkin and Carpenter‘s (2009) regression 
discontinuity  analysis,  finds  that  motor  vehicle  fatalities  among  individuals  just  shy  of  their 
twenty-first birthday are 14% below those of individuals just past that birthday.  That estimate,  
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  This evolutionary semi-convergence in method and findings is a natural consequence of 
the ethos of academia, which  is organized  as an  ―independent, collective, cumulative, open-
ended enterprise of knowledge creation and testing‖ (Henig, 2008, p. 232).  This ethos embraces 
diversity  in  the  identities  of  those  investigating  a  topic  and  the  methods  used  in  doing  so, 
allowing alternative approaches to compete over time.  The quality of the analysis is emphasized 
over the ease or speed of execution.  And each researcher is expected to make a good faith effort 
to find the ―correct‖ answer to the question posed, without omitting contradictory evidence or 
overstating  the  case.    This  process  often  requires  a  decade  or  more  to  culminate,  because 
academic studies take years to complete and publish (and, in some cases, refute), and many such 
studies may be needed to ultimately settle the question.  These properties were on display for the 
topic on which Henig focuses, charter schools, as they were for the MLDA.  Throughout the 
1980s,  conflicts  arose  in  the  MLDA  literature over  measurement  (Williams  et  al.,  1983  vs. 
Males,  1986;  also  Hammond,  1973  vs.  Zylman,  1974),  study  design  (Garber,  1988),  and 
execution (General Accounting Office, or GAO, 1987), which are now substantially resolved. 
Policymakers, however, are rarely afforded this much time.  Accordingly, the limited 
evidence that is available at the point of decision should be carefully scrutinized and judiciously 
evaluated.  This  certainly  would  have  been  merited  in  1983  and  1984  regarding  the  raised 
MLDA.  As Figure 1 illustrates, the published (or soon to be published) studies then available 
were relatively few in number, weak in design, and variable in their findings.  Also, the GAO 
(1987)  shows  that  some  did  not  adhere  to  generally  accepted  methodological  standards,  a 
problem even more common in those contemporaneous studies that were never published.  It 
                                                                                                                                                       
while sound, is local, and cannot be used to infer the percentage reduction in fatalities across all 
ages affected by raised MLDAs.  This is probably much smaller: Dee (1999) and Miron and 
Tetelbaum  (2009)  both  find  that  outlawing  drinking  among  eighteen  and  nineteen  year-olds 
hardly changes fatalities, but outlawing it for twenty year-olds has a substantial effect.  
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should have been—and, eventually, was—a focus of Congressional hearings to identify the best 
available evidence on the effects of a changed MLDA and weight it accordingly. 
There is, however, another, more subtle sense in which judiciousness is called for, which 
derives from the fact that early studies are also systematically more favorable than later, more 
comprehensive analyses with improved study designs.  Collectively, then, these early estimates 
were a biased predictor of the long run, nationwide effects of a raised MLDA.  This is not just a 
matter of hindsight: one could have justifiably been concerned about this at the time, because the 
technical and conceptual groundwork for these concerns had already been laid. 
Technically, the quasi-experimental methodology used in most early studies of this issue 
(and  which  continues  to  be  common  in  the  traffic  safety  literature)  has  three  important 
limitations.  First, these studies operate on short time scales.  Often, the number of post-law years 
analyzed is just one or two; the number of pre-law years may not be much larger.  Without direct 
controls for economic or drinking-related factors, which are rarely present, it can be difficult to 
accurately identify baseline short run and long run trends from which to extract the effect of the 
law.  Second, these studies assume that the paired law-changing and control states are otherwise 
equivalent.  This can bias estimates, because this assumption is not empirically supported (Grant, 
2010),  and  does  overstate  statistical  significance,  because  state-specific  random  effects  are 
neither allowed in the underlying empirical model nor identified.  (This method assumes only 
sampling  variation  is  present.)    In  Cook  and  Tauchen‘s  (1984)  panel  study,  for  example, 
spanning eight years and forty-eight states, the standard error of the MLDA effect is about three 
percentage points.  It is only twice as large in the typical quasi-experimental study that analyzed 
four or five years of data on a single state.  Finally, quasi-experimental methods are relatively 
subjective, with researcher discretion in the state studied, the choice of control group, and the  
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way in which it is integrated into the analysis (see below). 
These  technical  issues  coincide  with  two  longstanding  themes  in  social  science  that 
articulate why early studies of the effects of traffic safety legislation could be overly favorable.
5  
The first of these, a product of the law and economics literature, builds on Stigler‘s ―endogeneity 
of laws‖ (see Siegelman, 2002, and also Andenaes, 1975)  This concept holds that, in order to 
accurately  infer  an  existing  law‘s  effect  on  social  outcomes,  attention  must  be  paid  to  the 
circumstances  of  its  adoption.    If  a  law  is  passed  because  of  a  temporary  flare-up  in  an 
undesirable behavior, if it is associated with other efforts to address the problem in question, if it 
is adopted as part of a package of broader reforms, traditional statistical methods—regression-
based or quasi-experimental—will probably overstate its causal effects.  A conversation  in a 
hearing described below nicely illustrates this point—and its subtlety (H4, 1986, p. 13-14): 
Rep. Nancy Johnson (R-CT): How do you take into account whether or not, for 
example, there has been a strong movement within a state among high school 
students to focus on this problem? 
 
GAO Official: That is the beauty of the control group. 
 
Johnson:  In  your  control  group,  you  have  states  that  have  not  changed  their 
policy…but  do  you  have  all  of  those  same  groups  that  are  springing  up 
throughout the Nation, the teenage groups, the MADD parents and so forth? 
 
GAO: [Without directly answering the question, simply notes that some control 
groups are age-based, such as 21-25 year olds, while others are geographical, such 
as a neighboring state.] 
 
  The second theme, coming out of the criminology and sociology literatures, complements 
                                                 
5  Two  other  themes  explain  why  traffic  safety  laws  might  not  be  effective,  providing  a 
conceptual basis for a failure to reject the standard null hypothesis.  One emphasizes the limits of 
deterrence.  In criminology the empirical performance of deterrence theory is mixed; increasing 
the certainty of punishment—which requires resources—matters much more than increasing its 
severity (see Lewis, 2009, and many sources therein, and Ross, 1992).  The other emphasizes the 
unanticipated effects of policy, which can serve to offset its effectiveness.  Males (1986) and 
Asch and Levy (1990), for example, argue that higher drinking ages simply postpone drinking 
onset and the fatalities associated with ―inexperienced drinkers.‖  
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and augments the first.  It emphasizes the importance of public support in making laws effective, 
and thus suggests that even if the effects of law in voluntarily-adopting states are accurately 
estimated, these estimates may not accurately predict the performance of future laws that are not 
adopted in the same manner. 
I have read over most of the papers I have written on this general subject during 
the past thirty years.  In nearly every one of them, I state that the weakest link in 
attacking this problem has been public support.  What we perceive as low-level 
action against the drunken driver  is probably  a  direct result of  lack of public 
support.  We can inform and we can enforce and as a result change behavior 
through fear for a while.  But when we fail to change attitude, regression is bound 
to occur (Borkenstein, 1985). 
 
[A late-1980s decline in media attention is] one of the reasons I suspect we are 
seeing a slow-down in the progress, because research continues to show that the 
most  effective  laws  are  those  that  have  a  combination  of  enforcement  and 
repeated publicity (Brian O‘Neill, IIHS, H5, Aug., 1988, p. 36.) 
 
[All three law enforcement officers interviewed agreed that] the law is a starting 
point to make the public more aware of the dangers of drinking and driving, but to 
be effective the  law  needed public support.  The  law enforcement supervisors 
acknowledged that without public support for the…juvenile drunk driving law, 
legal sanctions would have a minimal impact in deterring this offense (Lewis, 
2009, p. 126-127, discussing zero tolerance laws). 
 
This matters not just in theory, but practice, because many 21 year old MLDAs were adopted 
because of the Congressional incentive: 
[Lack of enforcement] points up some of the concern that I have.  I think this is 
particularly true in the South and the West—there is a resentment of federally 
imposed standards of that type, and therefore  it tends to be discounted at the 
enforcement level and in the courts. (Jim Burnett, Chairman of the NTSB, H1, 
1983, p. 236.)  
 
And sometime, a federal mandate is…more highly resented than any other single 
factor concerning a  law.  And  in  some states the governor‘s [highway safety] 
representative, for example, may not even mention that a requirement is a federal 
law for fear of raising a red flag. (John Hanna, Deputy Commissioner, Virginia 
Department of Motor Vehicles, H5, Aug., 1988, p. 48.) 
 
The evidence suggests that these two themes are relevant, and that they help explain the  
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evolution  in  findings  displayed  in  Figure  1.  As  documented  by  Grant  (2011)  for  three 
Congressionally-incentivized drunk driving laws and by Miron and Tetelbaum (2009) for the 
MLDA specifically, fatality changes associated with new laws are consistently larger in those 
states that adopt them earliest, without being spurred to do so by Congress, even when the 
estimation method is kept the same. 
Miron  and  Tetelbaum‘s  results  are  summarized  in  Figure  2.    The  top  pane  contains 
estimates of the percentage change in youth traffic fatalities generated by the MLDA of twenty-
one, taken from a sequence of individual state time-series regressions, plotted against the year 
this MLDA was adopted.  (These regressions each cover the same span of years and include the 
same control variables.  States maintaining an MLDA of 21 since 1975 are excluded.)   The 
bottom  pane  contains  the  cumulative  estimate,  of  all  states  adopting  this  MLDA  up  to that 
particular point in time.  Both panes also contain 95% confidence intervals.  The cumulative 
estimate falls by more than half over the course of the decade spanned in the figure, from 10% to 
less than 5%.  Early-adopting states yield more favorable estimates than late-adopting states do. 
Of course, this hindsight was not available in 1984 for the MLDA—the only option was 
to be judicious in evaluating the evidence: 
It  seems…clear  that  establishing  a  21-year  minimum  nationwide  drinking  age 
would have a salutary impact on drunk driving statistics, although the extent of 
the prospective improvement is far from certain.  (Sen. Charles Mathias, R-MD, 
H5, 1984, p. S8226.) 
 
I suspect that you have had some testimony about the overwhelming evidence 
statistically about this, and I suspect that I am  hindered  by  my 35  years as a 
researcher when I say that the research is not as overwhelming as we would like it 
to be.  (Morris Chafetz, former director of the NIAAA and member, Presidential 
Commission on Drunk Driving, H2, 1984, p. 71.)  
 
The results to date of studies increasing (sic) the drinking age have generally been 
favorable.  However, these laws have been in place for only a short time.  During 
that time, other factors which could produce a reduction in accidents have been  
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present…the question of whether increasing the legal age of purchase will reduce 
accidents remains to be proven when  longer experience with these  higher age 
laws generates sufficient data for a more definitive analysis of impact, from which 
the effect of transient economic factors can be eliminated.  (Alcohol and Highway 
Safety: A Review of the State of Knowledge, 1984, p. 49.)
6 
 
In  the  Congressional  analysis  of  the  MLDA ,  which  prevailed —this  judiciousness,  or  the 
optimism of its supporters?  We investigate this issue in the next section. 
 
Section III.  The Evaluation of the Evidence in Four Congressional Hearings. 
 
  To examine how the political theatre evaluated the evidence on this issue, we rely on a 
set of Congressional subcommittee hearings.  There a range of witnesses spoke extensively about 
the evidence on the effects of a raised MLDA and responded to a wide variety of questions.  The 
studies discussed in these hearings are more numerous than those cited (less frequently) on the 
floors of the House and Senate, while the positions argued by the same individual or organization 
varied little across time.  These hearings thus provide a reasonably detailed and comprehensive 
record of the various perspectives on the evidence, the way in which these perspectives were 
presented and examined, and the political and technical skill of the participants. 
The first hearing was held in October, 1983, by the House Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Transportation, and Tourism, one month after a bill was introduced in the House to directly 
establish  an  MLDA  of  21  nationwide.    This  well-attended  hearing,  held  when  there  was 
increasing momentum for federal action but ambiguity about the form that action might take, 
featured  an  exhaustive  witness  list  and  active  participation  from  committee  members,  who 
                                                 
6 Despite its relevance, this NHTSA publication in general, and this conclusion specifically, was 
wholly ignored in all debate and hearings, by NHTSA and everyone else, both before and  after 
the NMDAA became law.  It and a later edition are discussed below.  
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peppered the witnesses with wide array of questions. 
  The next two hearings were held by the Senate Subcommittees on Surface Transportation 
and Drug and Alcohol Abuse in June, 1984.  These were pro forma, as legislative and executive 
support for the NMDAA was already established.  No members besides the chair attended.  Each 
witness read a prepared statement, but there were few questions. 
The last hearing occurred in September, 1986, before the Subcommittee of Investigations 
and Oversight, House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, to discuss a draft report 
prepared for its chair, James Oberstar, by the GAO, summarizing and assessing the evidence on 
the  effects  of  the  raised  MLDA.    The  very  existence  of  this  hearing  testifies  to  hastiness 
evaluating the evidence prior to passing the NMDAA: 
Congress  did  take  an  action  in  1984,  admittedly  without…full  committee 
exploration of the issue, but just on the basis of data at hand, and Congress acted.  
All right.  Now we are trying to come back and analyze the benefits of that action.  
(Rep. James Oberstar, D-MN, H1, 1986, p. 200.) 
 
No other hearing  focused on the MLDA  like these  four did.  However, we did also review 
several others, held before 1983 or after 1986, that were peripherally related to the issue, along 
with the relevant Congressional debate, all of which are listed in the chronology in the Appendix. 
Despite  this  variety  of  purpose,  each  hearing‘s  format  and  participants  were  similar.  
Witnesses  appeared  in  groups,  read  a  prepared  statement  and  answered  questions.    Some 
questions were probing, to test the accuracy of a claim; others were inquisitive, to gather more 
information; still others were speculative, to consider a new idea.  Witness groups tended to be 
homogenous: pro-MLDA testimony followed by anti-MLDA testimony, or government officials 
followed  by  industry  groups  followed  by  student  groups,  each  of  which  had  a  material  or 
governmental interest in the hearing‘s outcome.  Disinterested witnesses were arguably limited 
to a handful of academics, fewer than one-tenth of those testifying.  Thus these hearings, while  
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invariably collegial, were also inherently adversarial. 
Advocates  of  the  higher  drinking  age  included  the  insurer-funded  IIHS,  elite  safety 
organizations  such  as  the  NSC,  grassroots  advocates  such  as  MADD  and  parent-teacher 
associations,  along  with  NHTSA  and  the  NTSB.
7  These  organizations  all  have  extensive 
experience in the policymaking process; several also have analytical skill.  NHTSA, for example, 
manages the FARS (Fatality Analysis Reporting System) data  used in many traffic safety 
analyses, while the NSC  edits the well-regarded  Journal  of  Safety  Research  and  the  IIHS 
regularly publishes solid quasi-experimental analyses of traffic safety laws in academic journals.  
On the other hand, the opposition, mostly groups representing students and the restaurant and 
beverage industries, possessed less policymaking experience and little analytical skill. 
Thus, in contrast to academia, the evidence on the effects of the MLDA was assessed in 
an adversarial, political environment under significant time pressure, between two sides matched 
in their passion about the issue but unequal in technical skill and political experience.  For the 
least  disinterested  participants,  these  centripetal  forces  did  not  encourage  judiciousness,  but 
rather its opposite: selective citation of the evidence and flexible standards as to what constituted 
evidence. 
  This selectivity is well-illustrated by focusing on the work of one influential researcher, 
Alexander Wagenaar.  Wagenaar (1981) found that in the year after Michigan raised its drinking 
age from 18 to 21, in December, 1978, crashes involving 18-20 year old drivers that police 
reported had been drinking fell by 31%.  Because police-reported drinking can be unreliable, a 
                                                 
7  The NTSB‘s advocacy was unusual.  Its specialty is investigating the causes of particular 
accidents  in  detail,  not  assessing  the  merits  of  traffic  safety  legislation.    A  review  of  its 
publications,  available  online,  confirms  that  the  MLDA  is  the  such  only  such  law  it  has 
forcefully advocated.  While NHTSA consistently argued that raising the MLDA dramatically 
improved traffic safety, prior to June, 1984, it also argued that the decision to do so should be 
left to the states, consistent with the views of the President.  
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common ―three-factor surrogate‖ was also analyzed; it fell by 18%.  There was little change in 
control groups.  A later study (Wagenaar, 1983) found that in Maine, which raised its drinking 
age from 18 to 20 in October, 1977, there was a slight increase in crashes by affected drivers 
with police-reported drinking, but a 19% reduction in the three-factor surrogate.  On the pro-
raised-MLDA side, the largest of these four numbers, 31%, was widely cited (it is one of the 
largest bubbles in Figure 3, below), while the others were never mentioned.  The other side, in 
contrast, also cited one of Wagenaar‘s findings—the increase in police-reported drinking crashes 
after the MLDA rose in Maine. 
Coupled  to  this,  also  on  both  sides,  were  uncontrolled  comparisons  or  anecdotes  of 
dubious inferential value as to the effect of a raised MLDA (H1, 1983, p. 140; H2, 1984, p. 43): 
Dr. Arnold Yeager, Physicians for Automotive Safety: My dental office happens 
to be on a corner, and kids…when they are drinking beer in their car, like to toss 
the beer bottles…out of the window.  In the last 6 months I have picked up far 
fewer beer cans since the drinking age in New Jersey has been raised.   
 
Robert Snow, Florida Entertainment and Dining Association: The reason we do 
not agree [with a raised MLDA] is that it has been a failure in the State of Florida, 
where in 1980 there were 19 fatalities of 18-year-olds when it was legal to drink.  
In 1982, the last reporting year, there was an increase of 20 percent of those 18-
year-old fatalities when it was illegal to drink.  
 
For these participants, all this evidence supported divergent, intransigent assessments, 
which remained even after the NMDAA was law (H4, 1986, pp. 51, 174, 186): 
Allan  Williams,  VP  for  Research,  IIHS:  There is  no  question  that  raising  the 
alcohol purchasing age results in fewer alcohol-related motor vehicle crash deaths 
and injuries in this high-risk group.  It reduces them by 10-20%, and it does so 
year after year…If anything, too much research has been done on this topic. 
 
Michael  Birkley,  Board  Member,  National  Licensed  Beverage  Association: 
Despite the frequently recurring theme in popular accounts of selected studies, we 
have found no consistently reliable basis for the conclusion that raising the legal 
drinking age has, can, or is even likely to save lives among the affected age group 
in any jurisdiction.  In our opinion, none of the so-called drinking age impact 
studies conducted to date are capable of supporting such a conclusion.  
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These excesses of an adversarial system are to some extent unavoidable, an inevitable 
consequence of ―the fact that the recognition of any condition as a social problem is a political 
matter.‖  But while this may explain the absence of judiciousness from the least disinterested 
participants, countervailing forces—standards of professionalism among policy analysts, and for 
some, a public mission—temporize such excesses in the others.  Their behavior is shaped more 
by the technical skills and judgement that they possess and that is required of them in order to be 
credible, what one might call the supply and demand of judiciousness.  It is still not enough. 
Most fundamentally, the technical skills on which judiciousness is based are not required 
in  order  for  key  witnesses  to  be  credible.    NHTSA,  the  NTSB,  and  the  NSC  have  natural 
institutional credibility before Congress, while others, including former government officials and 
(to a lesser extent) representatives of the IIHS, based in metropolitan Washington, D.C., have 
personal credibility developed through their involvement with policymakers on a wide range of 
traffic safety issues.  (Innvaer et al., 2002, document that personal connections greatly facilitate 
the use of research in policy formation.)  Technical skills only complement and reinforce these 
other sources of credibility.  Thus, there was no imperative for NHTSA to publish (academically) 
those few analyses of traffic safety laws that have been produced in-house, including three key 
MLDA studies from the early 1980s discussed below.  In a similar vein, the NTSB‘s support of a 
raised  MLDA  was  not  based  on  a  formal  review  of  the  evidence,  and  its  widely-repeated 
calculations of lives saved, used to support its recommendation, were erroneous (Males, 1986).  
The written record contains no hint that any of this mitigated either organization‘s credibility. 
Judiciousness is also inhibited by the specialization of advocacy and evaluation in a small 
number of actors that hark from a uniform intellectual tradition.  A longstanding divide within 
traffic safety separates program evaluators, who deliver rapid estimates of the effects of new  
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laws  using  quasi-experimental  designs,  from  social  scientists  (particularly  economists),  who 
conduct large-scale, retrospective regression analyses of laws‘ long-run effects.  NHTSA and the 
IIHS  operate  in  the  first  tradition,  not  surprisingly,  but  the  foundations  for  judiciousness—
skepticism of quasi-experimental analyses of uncontrolled phenomena, and an appreciation of 
the social science themes discussed above—stem from the second.  This intellectual bifurcation 
mirrors that in the policy sciences in general, generated by cultural and philosophical differences 
between the two disciplines, which ―seem to be too many…to permit cooperation‖ (Dror, 1971, 
Chapter 6, and p. 34), and perpetuated by a substantial temporal divide in their studies of any 
given issue.  As Figure 1 indicates, for the MLDA specifically, the quasi-experimental designs 
favored by program evaluators predated, by a decade, the panel designs favored by economists 
(Grant, 2011, shows other literatures are similar).  The appearance of the social science themes 
discussed above takes even longer;
8 by this time program evaluators‘ attention has shifted to 
other topics. 
A final contributor is the near-absence of academics, who tend to be more judicious by 
nature and training (this comes through clearly in the hearings), from testimony.  This is partly a 
matter of specialization, and partly cultural: 
Increasingly,  public  debates  about  [modern  policy  issues]  resemble  adversary 
proceedings  in  a  court  of  law,  but  with  an  important  difference—the  lack  of 
generally  accepted  rules  of  evidence.    Some  participants  are  able  to  take 
advantage of the relative informality of the process, but to scientists even codified 
adversary procedures seem inappropriate and alien to their tradition.  In science 
the issue is not a witness‘s credibility but his specific competence…and this is not 
reliably established by an adversary debate.  (Majone, 1989, p. 4) 
 
In fact, for the MLDA, the divergence goes further: we will soon show that surprisingly few 
                                                 
8 These have only recently made forceful appearances in the empirical literature on drunk driving 
legislation: by Miron and Tetelbaum (2009) for the MLD A, Freeman (2007) for .08 laws,  and 
Lewis (2009) for zero tolerance laws.  These studies come twenty-five, seven, and fourteen years 
after the appropriate Congressional incentive was enacted.  
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studies cited in Congressional testimony were conducted by academics or published in academia. 
  In  consequence,  while  both  of  the  intellectual  foundations  for  judiciousness  were 
articulated  across  these  hearings,
9  and  though  some  witnesses‘  statements  did  evince  such 
judiciousness,  as  quoted  previously,  such  statements  were  rare  and  easily  overlooked.    The 
testimony of the most prestigious participants, such as the leaders of NHTSA and the NTSB, was 
unreservedly supportive of the raised MLDA‘s effects.  Optimism prevailed over judiciousness. 
This comes through clearly in the evidence cited in these hearings, shown in the bubble 
plots in Figure 3.  As before, each bubble represents a study, but now its color indicates the 
authors‘ affiliation, while  its area  is proportional to the  number of  participants that cited  it; 
studies ultimately published in refereed journals are circumscribed in black.  The horizontal axis 
is  the  year  of  release  or  publication;  the  vertical  axis  is  the  percentage  change  in  fatalities 
involving affected drivers.  Notice, as claimed above, that studies published by academics form a 
minority of the evidence that is cited; that only about half the evidence cited was ever published; 
and that none of these published studies were conducted by a government agency. 
The top plot in the figure depicts the evidence cited by three high-profile raised-MLDA 
advocates  across  the  three  hearings  conducted  prior  to  July,  1984,  while  the  middle  plot 
illustrates the evidence cited by five government agencies or quasi-governmental organizations 
                                                 
9 ―Long term improvement in the DWI problem will be achieved only if public attitudes change.  
Suggestions  contrary  to  this  basic  proposition  serve  only  to  divert  attention  from  workable 
approaches  having  the  potential  for  significant  benefit  to  society....    In  the  field  of  alcohol 
control, there have been many examples of programs and control strategies which ultimately 
have proved ineffective, even when first advocated and employed they seemed to show great 
promise.‖ (American Automotive Association, H0, 1982, pp. 671-672) 
―Most research published to date is based on faulty premises such as assuming a direct 
cause and effect relationship between drinking age and crashes without taking into account other 
variables…[such as] changes in DWI enforcement and increased public education…and covering 
only short time periods which are inadequate for determining whether changes occurring after a 
lowering or raising of the drinking age are indicative of long-term effects.‖ (Ronald Sarasin, 
Director of Government Relations, National Restaurant Association, H2, 1984, pp. 44-46)  
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in  these  same  hearings.  (The organizations  included  are  identified  in  the  note to the  table.  
Opponents of the raised MLDA, having few supportive studies to cite, mostly referred to the 
experience of states like Montana and Minnesota, where MLDA increases were not associated 
with fatality changes.)  The weighted or unweighted means or medians of the evidence cited by 
advocates are all at least 20%.  The evidence cited by government is less numerous, less diverse, 
and even  more  favorable: these  means or medians always exceed 25%.   These numbers are 
similar  to  those  listed  by  President  Reagan  in  his  signing  statement,  quoted  above,  but  are 
substantially higher than the best available estimate that could have been obtained at that time. 
For this estimate we are indebted to the GAO, which, in 1986, conducted a systematic 
literature review and evaluation, the subject of the fourth hearing we analyzed.  The evidence 
cited  therein,  fourteen  studies  of  fatal  or  injury  crashes  that  met  reasonable  methodological 
standards, is listed in the bottom bubble plot in Figure 3.  With one small exception, discussed 
shortly, each of these studies utilizes data that ends in 1982, and so could have been produced 
before 1984.  With three exceptions, identified in the plot, each study was produced by then.  
The mean and median effect of a raised MLDA across these fourteen studies is 13%. 
Most of this evidence comes from single-state studies, but this same figure obtains in the 
first study to examine evidence from all nineteen states that raised their MLDAs between 1976 
and  1982,  inclusive:  DuMouchel,  Williams,  and  Zador  (1987).    All  other  contemporaneous 
studies  that  were  similarly  broad  in  scope  obtained  somewhat  smaller  estimates.
10  (These 
findings suggest that the evidence that was available in 1984  may have come from states where 
                                                 
10  Hoskin,  Yalung-Mathews,  and  Carraro‘s  (1986)  quasi-experimental  study,  Saffer  and 
Grossman‘s (1987) pooled TSCS regression analysis, and Hoxie and Skinner‘s (1987) traditional 
panel study obtained estimates of 5%, 8%, and 11%. Each included all states that raised the 
MLDA over its sample period. DuMouchel, Williams, and Zador‘s panel analysis, first available 
in 1985 and included in the GAO review, spanned the years 1975-1984.  
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the effect was relatively large.  Certainly the distribution of studies across states at that time was 
not uniform.  Of these nineteen states, three—IL, MI, and ME—were studied three times each, 
while eight others—MD, NJ, RI, GA, OH, TX, CT, and NE—had never been studied.) 
On  the  floor of  Congress,  debate  was  more  wide-ranging  and  philosophical,  and  the 
empirical  evidence  received  only  modest  attention.    Most  claims  of  the  NMDAA‘s  effects 
devolved to an influential IIHS study of nine MLDA-raising states (Williams et al., 1983, well-
represented in Figure 3), which found an average fatality reduction of 28%.  These claims were 
rarely  disputed.    Citations  of  this  figure  collapsed  shortly  after  the  NMDAA  was  passed, 
however, with the appearance of the studies just mentioned, which each found effects of 13% or 
less.    Twenty  years  later,  as  we  have  mentioned,  large-scale  panel  estimates  of  the  raised 
MLDA‘s long-run effects were half this size.  Much of this difference is attributable to the early-
adopter effect. 
Our documentation of a lack of judiciousness is complete, but not our explanation for it, 
which is, in a away, reduced form.  Two of the three underlying causes, the isolation of policy 
analysts  from  social  science  traditions  and  from  academia,  are,  for  key  actors,  matters  of 
organizational design.  In particular, NHTSA, the federal agency responsible for traffic safety 
policy, could be structured to possess or develop the human capital required to form a more 
discerning view of the evidence.  In the next section, we show that it has not, and explain why. 
 
IV.  NHTSA and the Evaluation of Drunk Driving Countermeasures. 
 
NHTSA,  the  youngest  of  the  Department  of  Transportation‘s  thirteen  agencies,  was 
founded  in  1970,  long  after  agencies  devoted to the  safety  of  aircraft,  railroads,  and  motor  
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carriers were formed.  Its founding coincided with a change in emphasis regarding traffic safety, 
away from a focus on the provision and safety of roads and the enforcement of basic traffic laws, 
towards improving the safety of vehicles (Gusfield, 1988), sparked by the 1965 publication of 
Ralph Nader‘s Unsafe at Any Speed.
11  While  its  mandate  has  always  been to address both 
vehicle and human factors, the former took precedence in the agency‘s early years (Gusfield, 
1988).  But human factors, particularly drunk driving and restraint use, received much more 
attention  beginning  in  the  1980s  (Zimring,  1988).  By  2002,  the  administrator  of  NHTSA 
claimed that human, or behavioral, factors were the predominant cause of traffic fatalities (H6, 
June, 2002, p. 8), a position still held today (see the March, 2010 hearing discussed below). 
  Two general approaches, or paradigms, can  be  adopted toward  addressing  behavioral 
factors.  One is deterrence-based: 
Americans place a high value on individualism.  They see the world as malleable 
to  individual  will  and  responsive  to  choice  and  moral  character.    It  is  to the 
individual that Americans so frequently look in placing responsibility for social 
problems.  It is the base assumption that supports the great faith we have that 
punishing the bad guys, the drivers, will deter drinking-driving in a society whose 
social institutions deter public transportation and support drinking practices with 
limited constraints (Joseph Gusfield, in Ross, 1992, pp. xi-xii).   
  
The  alternative  stresses  the  limits  of  deterrence  and  ―views  drunk  driving  as  a  predictable 
consequence of existing social institutions‖ (Ross, 1992, p. 167): 
My father was an alcoholic.  And, boy, I am going to tell you: All I remember 
from when I was a kid was how alcoholism can just literally destroy a family…  
But  I  used to  be  a  police  officer  years  ago,  and  I  guess  because  of  my  own 
background and the experience I had in law enforcement, I am convinced that 
alcoholism is a sickness that you just cannot cure by tougher penalties.  It does not 
                                                 
11  The vehicle-factors side of NHTSA differs greatly from the behavioral-factors side.  It focuses 
on regulation and standard setting, absent key technical information that is possessed by the 
automakers, in the presence of well-matched adversaries, the automobile industry and consumer 
groups (see Breyer, 1982, and Pecht et al., 2005).  The research  model discussed herein could 
have been influenced by the early preeminence of the vehicle side, that is, features suitable to 
vehicle factors may have been inappropriately applied to behavioral factors as well.  
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work.   It  did  not  work  for  my  dad.    And  it  does  not  work  for  anybody  else 
either…    So  it  just  seems  to  me  that  we  ought  to  be  focusing  more  of  our 
resources  on  treatment  and  recovery  programs  too.    (Sen.  Ben  Nighthorse 
Campbell, R-CO, H6, Feb., 2002, p. 50.) 
 
The  deterrence-based  approach  prevailed  during  the  1980s.    It  was  ―understandably 
popular with people who have directly or indirectly, through friends and relatives, experienced 
harm  in  the  course  of  alcohol-related  crashes‖—the  natural  constituency  of  drunk  driving 
advocacy groups such as MADD, which rose to prominence during this period (Ross, 1992, p. 
176, and multiple sources cited therein).  This was buttressed by the concomitant political shift 
toward  conservatism  (Reinarman,  1988),  the  ―inevitable  change  in  style  that  happens  when 
criminal justice initiatives trickle down from elites to the generally conservative crime-control 
ideology of local America,‖ and a ―hardening of public attitudes about the dangers of driving 
after  drinking…due  in  part  to  scientific  demonstrations  linking  elevated  blood  alcohol  with 
automobile crashes‖ (Zimring, 1988, pp. 379, 381).  In 1984 NHTSA‘s Alcohol and Highway 
Safety (Ch. 6) outlined the key features of their ―current approach‖ to controlling drunk driving.  
Of the seven points emphasized in that approach, one pertains to seat belt usage, and another to 
changing societal norms.  The other five are deterrence-based (including increasing resources 
and political pressure for ―increased countermeasure activity in the States and communities‖). 
Ross (1992) deftly analyzes the politics of the deterrence approach, pointing out that it is 
in many entities‘ interest to support it, including that of NHTSA: 
Much of the effectiveness of the citizen‘s movement [such as MADD] is due to its 
alliance with the traffic  safety establishment.  State and  federal officials  have 
found the movement useful for demonstrating popular support for statutes and 
other measures proposed by the safety agencies, while the programs endorsed by 
the  movement  have  been  rendered  rational  and  politically  sophisticated  in  the 
process.  The NHTSA has explicitly recognized the value of this constituency and 
has taken steps to enlarge and strengthen it (p. 177).  
 
Other groups benefitting from this approach are law enforcement, which gains resources, various  
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businesses that provide services to drunk driving convicts, and the beverage industry, because 
this  approach  emphasizes  the  culpability  of  the  drinking  driver  rather  than  the  larger  social 
context which supports the intersection of drinking and driving (also see Reinarman, 1988). 
  The research model used by NHTSA supports this emphasis on deterrence.  Its most 
essential feature is heavy reliance on contractors.  This can easily be documented, because one 
can search all of NHTSA‘s Behavioral Safety Research Reports online.  A total of 302 reports 
fall under the subject heading ―Impaired Driving—Alcohol.‖  NHTSA produced the content of 
47 of these reports, with the rest done by contract.  Using contractors for much of this research, 
such as ―demonstration projects‖ of various types, is understandable: a grant is not feasible, as 
this  is  not  basic  research  of  general  interest,  nor  is  in-house  production,  because  of  the 
interdisciplinary nature of the project and its distant location.  But using contractors to evaluate 
traffic safety laws cannot usually be justified this way, because these features do not pertain: this 
research  generally  involves  analyzing  publicly  available  data  with  straightforward  statistical 
methods to study a topic of public interest.  Yet this work, too, is heavily contractor-based.  Of 
the 25 alcohol-impaired driving research reports that fit the criteria just mentioned, only seven 
were produced by NHTSA. 
On the other hand, a contract allows the sponsoring agency to shape the scope and design 
of the project and to review the contractor‘s final report before deciding whether to release it: 
Political  actors—advocates  and  public  officials—have  [been]  moving  more 
toward a ―work for hire‖ model, employing research firms and consultants to give 
them the research they want, when they want it, on their own terms (Henig, 2008, 
p. 234). 
 
In this way NHTSA controls methods and (to a lesser extent) the reporting of findings, without 
developing in-house human capital.  As we show shortly, this serves political ends. 
  Qualitative evidence obtained at the very end of this research project  reinforces these  
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conclusions.    We  spoke  at  length  about  NHTSA  with  two  highly-experienced  traffic  safety 
experts: an independent policy advocate and a former high-level administrator in the agency.  
Both bemoaned the ―lack of an independent research capability within the agency,‖ particularly 
on the behavioral factors side, and described its origins and consequences as mostly or wholly 
political, emphasizing that the absence of this research capability benefits certain stakeholders—
particularly those, listed above, that gain from policies that are oriented toward deterrence. 
  In addition, we tried asking NHTSA directly about its use of contracting for behavioral 
factors  research.    As  a  baseline  for  comparison,  we  also  contacted  five  other  knowledge-
producing  federal agencies with safety-related orientations (in part or whole): the  Consumer 
Product  Safety  Commission  (CPSC),  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA),  the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  In these five agencies, it was 
not difficult to research a medium-to-high level research administrator, or their representative, 
who articulated that agency‘s research model and give a basic rationale for using that model.  In 
contrast, we were unable to speak or correspond with an appropriate individual within NHTSA, 
after multiple attempts.
12 
  This emphasis on contracting is complemented by another element of NHTSA‘s research 
model,  weak  engagement  with  academia.    We  searched  in  the  Web  of  Science  to  compare 
                                                 
12 The conservations, conducted by phone but for one e-mail exchange, typically lasted half an 
hour, and were centered around three questions: 1) What general principles are used to determine 
whether research is done in house, by grant, or by contract?, 2) How does the agency ensure the 
quality of the research that is produced?, and 3) Do oversight committees evince much concern 
the topics of the previous two questions?  Two attempts were made to reach the administrator in 
charge  of  NHTSA‘s  behavioral  factors  research;  the  agency‘s  communication  office  was 
contacted as well.  In each case a reply was requested but not received.  NHTSA‘s National 
Center for Statistics and Analysis manages the FARS data and produces many reports describing 
current accident trends, but almost never does the kind of research that is the focus of this paper; 
neither does the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center.  
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NHTSA‘s academic (article) output from 1995-2010 with that of the other five agencies listed 
above.  The results are listed in the table below: 
Agency  Articles  Average Number 
of Authors* 
% with Academic 
Coauthor* 
% with Consulting 
Coauthor* 
AHRQ  525  4.1  62  38 
CPSC  59  5.0  28  52 
EPA  91  4.0  60  46 
FTC  195  1.7  30  6 
HUD  71  4.7  60  42 
NHTSA  60  3.7  34  46 
* random sample of fifty articles   
The FTC and AHRQ publish the most and draw their coauthors predominantly from academia.  
The CPSC and NHTSA publish the least and draw most of their coauthors from consulting.  By 
these admittedly crude measures, NHTSA‘s link to academia is relatively weak.
13 
Both features of NHTSA‘s research model impede the agency‘s exposure to innovation 
and feedback.  This, in turn, facilitates the agency‘s emphasis on quasi-experimental studies of  
short run effects in early-adopting states, both in the studies it sponsors and when assessing the 
evidence on a law‘s effectiveness.  As previously noted, these designs tend to generate favorable 
conclusions, mostly because of the ―early-adopter effect‖ illustrated in Figure 2, but also, to a 
lesser extent, because the research design allows greater discretion in choosing the treatment and 
                                                 
13 The best example of NHTSA‘s academic isolation is the study it relies upon, to this 
day, to support its claim that an MLDA of 21 reduces fatalities by 13%: a 1985, unpublished, in-
house study of the experiences of thirteen states that were early adopters of higher MLDAs 
(Arnold, 1985—see NHTSA‘s March 2005 Traffic Safety Facts Research Note).  Ironically, it 
may  no  longer  physically  exist—it  is  not  available  in  the  National  Technical  Information 
Service, the Library of Congress, or the Department of Transportation library.  
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control group and interpreting the results.  The weaker findings of later studies are not integrated 
into NHTSA‘s literature evaluations; these studies‘ methods, panel regressions of most or all 
states over long time spans, do not influence the way laws are assessed by NHTSA contractors; 
the social science themes that preach caution in interpreting the results are neither acknowledged 
nor heeded. 
A second, complementary consequence of this research model is that it limits the amount 
of in-house human capital available to evaluate the literature or testify before Congress.  This is 
specifically discouraged in the only general government statement we could find on the methods 
by which the federal government should procure research, a 1962 report to President Kennedy: 
Where  management  decisions  are  based  substantially  on  technical 
judgments…there must be sufficient technical competence within the Government 
so  that  outside  technical  advice  does  not  become  technical  decisionmaking 
(sic)…We believe it highly important for the Government to be able to turn to 
technical advice from its own establishment as well as from outside sources.  One 
major source of this technical knowledge is the Government-operated laboratory 
or  research  installation…A  strong  base  of  technical  knowledge  should  be 
continually maintained within the Government service and available for advice to 
top  management  (Report  to  the  President  on  Government  Contracting  for 
Research and Development, Bureau of the Budget, May 1962, pp. 9-10). 
   
A  reduced supply of  such technical knowledge  makes NHTSA  more susceptible to political 
influences, which, as we  have  noted, tend to favor deterrence-based countermeasures.  And, 
without  it,  the  agency  never  acquires  the  aforementioned  intellectual  foundations  for 
judiciousness. 
  Around the time the NMDAA was passed, NHTSA produced three in-house studies of 
the effects of raised drinking ages: Maxwell (1981), Klein (1981), and Arnold (1985).  Each was 
included in the GAO review, and each used sound quasi-experimental designs to estimate short 
run effects in early-adopting states, which ranged from 9-15%.  These conclusions were no more 




14  The evidence produced by NHTSA was  not systematically 
skewed, simply representative of its peers in design and result.  Nevertheless, all of these studies 
are  subject  to  the  gene ral  weaknesses  of  th e  quasi-experimental  study  designs  that  were 
discussed  above,  and  NHTSA‘s  testimony  in  the  hearings  we  reviewed  indicated,  without 
reservation, that a raised MLDA would lead to large reductions in fatalities. 
  The NMDAA was not an isolated occurrence.  Fifteen years later, NHTSA‘s optimism 
about the effects of deterrence was, if anything, greater, in promoting federal action to encourage 
states to adopt laws that lower the per se illegal BAC limit to .08 (down, generally, from .10).  In 
1992 NHTSA recommended states adopt these laws, when there was virtually no evidence on 
their  effectiveness;  following  President  Clinton,  it  later  supported  a  strong  federal  incentive 
operating through the threatened withdrawal of highway funds, just as with the MLDA.  This 
passed Congress in 2000.  Though only 3% of all traffic fatalities involve drivers with BACs of 
.08 or .09, who would be affected by the law, double-digit fatality reductions are found in most 
of the evidence cited in the NHTSA-produced (1998) ―Presidential Initiative for Making .08 
BAC  the  National  Legal  Limit‖  advocating  this  legislation.    After  identifying  a  number  of 
methodological problems with several studies of the issue, including some studies sponsored or 
produced by NHTSA, a 1999 GAO report determined that ―the evidence does not conclusively 
establish that .08 BAC laws, by themselves, result in reductions in the number and severity of 
                                                 
14 Klein focuses on fatalities from single-vehicle accidents involving male drivers.  He finds that, 
after Maine‘s MLDA was raised from 18 to 20, daytime and nighttime fatalities involving 18-
year-olds fell, in about the same proportion, while daytime and nighttime fatalities involving 19-
year-olds were both unchanged.  Because daytime accidents are treated as a control group, this 
suggests the law had no effect.  But Klein focused instead on a different finding: a 15% reduction 
in fatalities involving 18-year-old and 19-year-old male drivers in all nighttime accidents, not 
just those  involving  a single  vehicle;  no estimate was obtained  for the control group.  This 
generous interpretation was adopted by the GAO and thus included in Figure 3.  As Arnold 
(1985) was not obtainable, as mentioned above, its successor (Womble, 1989) was reviewed.  
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alcohol-related crashes‖ and that ―NHTSA‘s position—that this evidence [on the effectiveness of 
.08 laws] was conclusive—was overstated.‖  The only contemporaneous large-scale panel study 
of the issue, written by an economist (Dee, 2001), was ignored in NHTSA‘s later review of the 
evidence (NHTSA‘s ―Setting Limits, Saving Lives,‖ 2000) and in the 2001 edition of Alcohol 
and Highway Safety.
15  Dee‘s study found that lowering the per se BAC standard from .10 to .08 
reduced fatalities by 3%.  Subsequent studies of both early-adopting and late-adopting states 
suggest even that estimate may be too high (for example, Freeman, 2007). 
This most recent, 2001 version of Alcohol and Highway Safety confirms that NHTSA‘s 
research model, too, is still in effect.  It, like some of its predecessors, was produced by (long-
time) contractors.  Its section on research design (pp. 99-100) discusses quasi-experimental and 
time-series  methods,  but  not  multivariate  regression,  and  virtually  no  regression-based 
evaluations of drunk driving legislation are included in its literature reviews.  Its conclusion 
identifies two groups of drunk driving countermeasures: one composed of five items ―that have 
shown promise but for which evaluations of alcohol-crash impact are as yet inconclusive,‖ the 
other  composed  of  twelve  items  ―with  strong  evidence  favoring  their  effectiveness.‖    No 
countermeasure  was  determined  to  be  ineffective.    Most  of  these  countermeasures  are 
deterrence-based.  In a closing criticism, the contractors note that countermeasures that are not 
deterrence-based, ―focusing on technology, the vehicle, the highway environment, and the more 
effective  control  of  alcohol  consumption…have  either  been  insufficiently  developed, 
insufficiently evaluated, or both‖ (p. 155).  Furthermore, our review of NHTSA‘s Behavioral 
                                                 
15  While published in 2001, Dee‘s paper was available as a manuscript in 2000.  The literature 
review included within his study is mentioned in Alcohol and Highway Safety, but its empirical 
findings are ignored.  The only other contemporaneous study by economists, Chaloupka, Saffer, 
and Grossman (1993), found that .08 laws had no effect on fatalities and was also ignored by 
NHTSA, the GAO, and Alcohol and Highway Safety.  
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Factors Research Reports indicates the trend is toward greater reliance on contractors over time. 
  At  present,  there  are  no  countervailing  forces  that  would  materially  disturb  this 
equilibrium.  Discussions with staff on two oversight committees, representing both parties and 
both houses of Congress, confirms their lack of concern with such technical matters.  Literature 
reviews—all  conducted  by  program  evaluators—have  not  drawn  the  technical  distinctions 
between alternative study designs that have been emphasized here.   In a recent subcommittee 
hearing, ―Assessing the Effectiveness of the NHTSA‘s Highway Traffic Safety Programs,‖ the 
only  reference  to  improving  the  evaluation  of  behavioral  safety  initiatives  came  from  the 
American Automobile Association (Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, House Committee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure, July 16, 2008, p. 35).  A more recent, high-profile hearing 
(―NHTSA Oversight: The Road Ahead,‖ Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection,  House  Committee  on  Energy  and  Commerce,  March  11,  2010)  contained  much 
discussion about the agency‘s funding, competence, and openness, but little about human factors 
and nothing about the evaluation of traffic safety legislation. 
 
V.  Conclusions and Prescriptions. 
 
  Given the inexorable political nature of traffic safety legislation, what can be done to 
improve assessments of this legislation at the time they are needed in the political theatre? 
One option is to upgrade research methods.  ―Before/after‖ quasi-experimental studies, 
like most panel regressions, do not account for the serial correlation in state fatality rates; time-
series analyses, which do, often fail to account for important economic factors (which do not 
follow simple autoregressive or moving average processes) and are generally applied one state at  
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a  time.    The  integration  of  regression-based  methods  with  the  use  of  control  groups,  while 
increasingly common among economic traffic safety analyses, are not often used in the early 
studies that dominate the political debate.  Economists‘ technical sophistication could be applied 
to  determine  the  best  way  to  integrate  these  methods  and  existing  data  to  form  optimum 
inferences of laws‘ effects in those states that adopt them first.  One promising approach has 
been developed by Grant (2010), who shows that analyses of the fraction of fatality-involved 
drivers  that  have  been  drinking  can  be  used  to  predict  the  effect  of  drunk  driving  laws  on 
fatalities and do not exhibit systematically larger estimates in early-adopting states. 
  A complementary option is organizational.  Enhance the technical research capabilities 
within  NHTSA  to  incorporate  a  wider  range  of  methodological  prowess,  including  panel 
regression  methods,  and  a  wider  appreciation  for  the  limits  of  policy  that  are  stressed  in 
significant themes within social science and economics.  Fuse greater links between NHTSA‘s 
professional analysts and the academic community, which would include publishing in a range of 
academic  journals  and  interacting  with  traffic  safety  analysts  of  diverse  professional 
backgrounds.  And broaden NHTSA‘s research focus to include both the short-run effects of new 
types of laws and the long-run effects of older laws that have become widely adopted.  Research 
departments at many federal agencies already have this kind of intellectual diversity and these 
links to academia.  
Such changes could easily lead to less enthusiastic empirical and political support for 
some traffic safety legislation, but that need not mean more traffic fatalities.  Every action has an 
opportunity  cost.    Political  and  intellectual  capital  spent  supporting  laws  that  are  largely 
ineffective  could  be  used  to  seek  out  and  evaluate  laws  or  other,  non-deterrence-based 
mechanisms that may be more effective, and supporting those that ultimately pass the bar.  
 
Table 1.  Social Activity Aimed at Reducing Drunk Driving (constructed from Howland, 1988). 
 
















1978-1981  36  37  22   
1981    17  13  44 
1982  109  81  35  47 
1983  117  169  50  129 
1984  103  162  42  108 
1985  89  76  36  223 
1986    45  9  178 
 
Note: Newspapers include the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, 
and The Wall Street Journal. Periodical volume comes from the Magazine Index. 
  
 
Figure 1.  Bubble Plot of Academic Studies of the MLDA (from Grant, 2011). 
 
 
Note: Black-ringed bubbles are supported by external funding.  The year is the year of publication.  The estimate of magnitude is 
the percentage change in the fatality or crash-involvement measure.  The volume of the bubble is proportional to the number of 
































Evolution of Findings: Minimum Legal Drinking Age
Pooled Panel Quasi-Experimental Cross Section
LOWER MLDA                                   HIGHER MLDA  
 
Figure 2.  The ―Early-Adopter Effect‖ (based on the findings of Miron and Tetelbaum, 2009).  















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Date of Adoption of MLDA of 21 
 
Figure 3.  Evidence Cited across Four Hearings on the Effect of a Raised MLDA on Crashes. 
 




Middle: Evidence Cited by Five Government Organizations, 1983-1984. 
 
 














































































































Advocates Academics Raw Statistics Government 
 
Bottom: Evidence Cited by the GAO, 1986-7. 
 
Note: The advocates are MADD, the American Automobile Association, and the IIHS.   The 
government  organizations  are  NHTSA,  the  NTSB,  the  NSC,  the  National  Association  of 
Governor‘s  Highway  Safety  Representatives,  and  the  Presidential  Commission  on  Drunk 
Driving.  The area of each bubble is proportional to the number of organizations citing that study 
in the hearings indicated.  Bubble colors indicate the affiliation of the authors of each study; 
―raw statistics‖ indicates the organization simply cited the change in crashes or fatalities after the 
adoption of  a  law, without referring to any  formal  study.  Bubbles ringed  in  black  indicate 
studies  published  in  a  refereed  journal.    For  such  studies,  the  horizontal  axis  indicates  the 
publication year; for the others it is the year the study was completed. 
 
Studies cited  in all three graphs: Williams et al. (1983), Klein (1981), Maxwell (1981), and 
Wagenaar (1981).  Additional studies cited in the top graph: Hingson et al. (1986), Cook and 
Tauchen (1984), Lillis et al. (1987), and Dunham and Detmer (1983).  Additional studies cited in 
the middle graph: Schroeder and Meyer (1983) and Lynn (1981).  Additional studies cited in the 
bottom graph: Schroeder and Meyer (1983), Saffer and Grossman (1987), Lillis et al. (1987), 
Florida Department of Community Affairs (1983), Emery (1983), Hingson et al. (1983), Hoskin 
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Appendix: A Chronology of the Minimum Drinking-Age Issue 
(excerpted almost verbatim from Appendix IV of GAO, 1987, with minor edits and additions; 
hearings or Congressional debate referenced in the text of this paper are italicized) 
 
 
Jan. 5, 1933. Ratification of the 21st amendment repealed prohibition and granted the states substantial 
power to regulate the purchase and possession of liquor within a state. 
 
Sept. 9, 1966.  Enactment of the Highway Safety Act of 1966 (Public Law 89-564) provided the first major 
impetus for federal involvement in drinking and driving by requiring the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) to establish uniform safety standards for state highway safety programs and to provide funds to 
carry out such programs. 
 
June 1967.  The DOT issued its “Alcohol in Relation to Highway Safety Standard,” to broaden the scope 
and number of activities directed at reducing alcohol-related accidents. 
 
1970.  NHTSA established a special office of alcohol countermeasures and the alcohol safety action 
program in 1970-71. 
 
July 1971. Ratification of the 26th amendment, extending the right to vote to 18-year-olds, helped prompt 
29 states to lower their minimum drinking ages in the early 1970’s. 
 
1973. NHTSA agreed by contract with the University of Michigan Highway Safety Research Institute to 
scientifically analyze the effects of lowering the legal drinking age from 21 to 18 on youths involved in 
crashes. The report showed a 10%-26% increase in crash involvement between 1968 and 1971. 
 
Jan. 2, 1974.  Enactment of the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act (Public Law 93-239) 
temporarily  established  a  nationwide  speed  limit  of  55  miles  per  hour.  The  law  relied  on  crossover 
sanctions  to  encourage  the  states  to  conform  to  the  act.  One  year  later  the  Federal-Aid  Highway 
Amendments Act of 1974 made this speed limit permanent. 
 
1976. From this year on, no state lowered its drinking age, partly because of empirical evidence that 
suggested a link between lowering the drinking age and increased traffic fatalities.  Between 1976 and 
1980, thirteen states raised their drinking ages by at least one year. 
 
April 14, 1982. The president appointed a 32-member commission to study the national problem of drunk 
driving. 
 
April 27, 1982.  H.R. 6170 was introduced by members of the Congress from New Jersey and Maryland 
and others to encourage the states to strengthen programs to control drunk driving. 
 
April 29, 1982.  [H0] The House Subcommittee on Surface Transportation held hearings on H.R. 6170; 
the legislation was generally supported by both the beverage and insurance industries. 
 
May 12, 1982.  H.R. 6170 was incorporated into H.R. 6211, which became the Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act of 1982. 
 
July 22, 1982.  The National Transportation Safety Board recommended a national minimum drinking age 
of 21. 
 
Sept. 29,1982.  The House of Representatives unanimously approved H.R. 6170. 
  
 
Oct. 1, 1982.  The Senate unanimously approved its counterpart bill to H.R. 6170, and the bill was sent to 
the president. 
 
Oct. 25, 1982.  Enactment of H.R. 6170 as Public Law 97-364 provided for a two-tier incentive grant 
program  to  improve  traffic  safety.  The  Congress  mandated  that  the  secretary  of  the  Department  of 
Transportation  would  consider  a  state  minimum  drinking  age  of  21  as  one  criterion  to  be  met  for 
supplemental grants. 
 
Nov. 30, 1982.  House and Senate resolutions were introduced on the legal minimum age for drinking and 
the purchase of alcohol. 
 
Dec. 13, 1982. The Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving recommended a uniform minimum drinking 
age of 21 in an interim report intended to allow state legislatures time to consider this recommendation 
early in their 1983 sessions. 
 
Jan. 6, 1983.  The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 contained a small section strongly 
encouraging the states to raise the minimum drinking age to 21. On the day the law was enacted, House 
Concurrent Resolution 23 was introduced, expressing the sense of the Congress that all states should 
establish a minimum drinking age of 21. 
 
Jan. 27, 1983.  A Gallup poll showed that 77 percent of Americans supported a uniform drinking age of 21 
for all states. 
 
April 7, 1983.  H.R. 2441 was introduced by a member of the Congress from Illinois to prohibit the use of 
federal highway funds by states whose minimum drinking age was lower than 21. 
 
April 20-21, 1983.  Senators from Missouri, Oregon, and Rhode Island introduced S. 1108, the Highway 
Safety Act of 1983, which provided more incentive grants to states for efforts to deter drunk driving. The 
bill was never voted out of committee.  A member of the Congress from California introduced H.R. 2693, 
a counterpart bill to S. 1108. 
 
May  6,  1983.    A  Senator  from  Pennsylvania  introduced  Concurrent  Resolution  32  to  express  the 
sentiment of the Congress that all states should establish a minimum drinking age of 21. 
 
Sept. 13, 1983.  Members of the Congress introduced H.R. 3870, a bill to prohibit the sale of alcoholic 
beverages to persons under 21 years of age under certain conditions. 
 
Oct. 1983.  A Senator from Indiana introduced S. 1948 as a counterpart to H.R. 3870. 
 
Oct. 4 and 19, 1983.  [H1]  The House Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism held 
hearings on H.R. 3870. 
 
Nov.  1983.    The  Presidential  Commission  on  Drunk  Driving  issued  its  final  report,  keeping  the 
recommendation for a uniform minimum drinking age of 21 for the purchase and public possession of all 
alcoholic beverages. 
 
Jan. 1984.  The National Safety Council supported the formation of an organization to follow up on the 
work of the Presidential Commission, called the National Commission Against Drunk Driving. Also, the 
president publicly rejected the support of the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving for a uniform 
minimum drinking age of 21. 
 
Jan. 24, 1984.  Members of Congress introduced H.R. 4616, a bill to amend the Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act of 1982 by increasing appropriations for highway safety.  
 
Feb. 7, 1984.  Several senators introduced S. 2263, the Uniform Minimum Drinking Age Act, to amend 
the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 by reducing the amount of federal highway aid for 
states that do not enact a legal minimum drinking age of 21. 
 
Feb. 22, 1984.  Members of the Congress introduced H.R. 4892, a counterpart to S. 2263. 
 
Feb. and March 1984.  The House Subcommittee on Surface Transportation held hearings on surface 
transportation issues, including a discussion of the drinking-age issue. 
 
April 5, 1984.  Members of Congress introduced H.R. 5383, a bill to reduce a state’s apportionment for 
federal aid for highways in specific fiscal years for states with drinking ages below 21. 
 
April  25,  1984.    A  member  of  the  Congress  from  California  introduced  H.R.  5504,  the  Surface 
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1984. 
 
April 30, 1984.  The House passed H.R. 4616 by voice vote. 
 
May 24, 1984.  Senators from New Jersey and Rhode Island introduced S. 2719 as a revision of S. 2263, 
a counterpart to H.R. 5383, and an attachment to H.R. 4616, the Child Safety Restraint Act. 
 
June 7, 1984.  The House approved H.R. 5383 as an amendment to H.R. 5504, which would reduce 
federal highway funds by 5 percent in fiscal year 1987 and 10 percent in fiscal year 1988 for states not 
enacting a minimum drinking age of 21. 
 
June 13, 1984.  The administration reversed its position on the minimum drinking-age issue through 
support of H.R. 4616 from the secretary of the Department of Transportation. 
 
June 14, 1984.  [H2]  The Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation held hearings on measures 
to combat drunk driving. 
 
June 19, 1984.  [H3]  The Senate Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse held hearings on a 
national minimum drinking age. 
 
June 26, 1984.  The Senate passed S. 1948 by a vote of 81-16, as an attachment to H.R. 4616. The 
Senate then passed its version of H.R. 4616 by a voice vote. 
 
June 27, 1984.  The House cleared the Senate version of H.R. 4616, including H.R. 5383. 
 
July 6, 1984.  The Senate version of H.R. 4616 was approved and sent to the president. 
 
July 17, 1984.  The Child Safety  Restraint Act (H.R. 4616), which included legislation for a national 
minimum  drinking  age  of  21,  was  signed  into  law  (Public  Law  98-363)  amending  the  Surface 
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. This act was strongly lobbied for by the Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving,  the  Parent  Teachers  Association,  the  National  Safety  Council,  the  National  Council  on 
Alcoholism, and the insurance industry. 
 
Sept.  21,  1984.    South  Dakota  brought  an  action  against  the  secretary  of  the  Department  of 
Transportation in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota, asking the court to declare the 
uniform  national  drinking  age  sanction  of  the  Surface  Transportation  Assistance  Act  of  1982 
unconstitutional, on the grounds that it violated the 10th and 21st amendments of the U.S. constitution. 
 
May 3, 1985.  The U.S. District Court issued a memorandum opinion and judgment dismissing the South 
Dakota case against the national drinking-age legislation.  
 
May 16, 1985.  Members of the Congress from Louisiana and Vermont introduced H.R. 2537 to apportion 
federal highway funds withheld from states for falling to establish a minimum drinking age of 21 if certain 
alcohol-related traffic fatalities are significantly reduced. 
 
June 3, 1985.  A member of the Congress from Louisiana introduced H.R. 2645 to repeal the national 
minimum drinking-age law. 
  
June 26, 1985.  South Dakota appealed the District Court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, contending again that the 10th and 21
st amendments were violated by the national drinking-age 
legislation. Nine other non-complying states supported South Dakota’s appeal. 
 
July 11, 1985.  Senators from Missouri and New Jersey introduced S. 1428, to make permanent the 
withholding of 10 percent of the apportionment from the Highway Trust Fund to states that have not 
adopted the national minimum drinking age. 
 
Sept. 27, 1985.  NHTSA and the Federal Highway Administration issued a notice of proposed rulemaking 
to implement section 6 of Public Law 98-363, which refers to the withholding of federal-aid highway funds. 
 
Oct. 21, 1985.  The Chair of the House Subcommittee of Investigations and Oversight, Committee on 
Public Works and Transportation, asks the GAO to review “existing evaluation[s] of drinking age laws to 
determine the extent to which they provide empirical support for federal and state initiatives to change the 
legal drinking age.” 
 
Nov. 12, 1985.  S.1428 was amended to S. 1730, the Consolidated Budget Reconciliation Act. 
 
Dec. 20, 1985.  S. 1730 was folded into H.R. 3128, the Budget Reconciliation Act, which did not pass but 
was carried over into the next year. 
 
April  7,  1986.    The  president  signed  the  Budget  Reconciliation  Act,  which  made  permanent  the 
withholding of 10 percent of federal highway funds from states not complying with a uniform drinking age. 
 
May 21, 1986.  The court of appeals for the eighth circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of South 
Dakota’s complaint challenging the constitutionality of the national drinking-age legislation. 
 
Sept.  16,  1986.    [H4]  Relying  on  an  early  draft  of  the  GAO  report,  the  House  Subcommittee  of 
Investigations  and  Oversight,  Committee  on  Public  Works  and  Transportation,  conducts  hearings  to 
assess evidence on the efficacy of minimum drinking age laws. 
 
March, 1987.  The GAO issues its final report, “Drinking-Age Laws: An Evaluation Synthesis of Their 
Impact on Highway Safety.”  This report finds that “raising the drinking age has a direct effect on reducing 
alcohol-related traffic accidents among youths affected by the laws.” 
 
June 23, 1987.  The U.S. Supreme Court affirms the constitutionality of the uniform national minimum 
drinking age in South Dakota v. Dole. 
 
June 29 and Aug. 2, 1988.  [H5]  The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, followed by 
the  Subcommittee  on  the  Consumer,  Committee  on  Commerce,  Science,  and  Transportation,  hold 
hearings on the Drunk Driving Prevention Act of 1988, which is ultimately tabled in the Senate after being 
opposed by the Reagan Administration. 
 
Feb. 27, June 27, 2002.  [H6]  The Senate Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies, 
followed by the House Subcommittee on Highways and Transportation, hold hearings on various traffic 
safety related issues.  